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FOREWORD
This monograph is the fourth in a series on the
Army’s Professional Military Ethic (PME) that the
Chief of Staff of the Army, General George W. Casey,
Jr., inaugurated in October 2009. In his series foreword, General Casey encouraged the Army to “think
critically about our PME and promote dialogue at all
levels as we deepen our understanding of what this
time-honored source of strength means to the profession today.”
In this monograph, Colonel Tony Pfaff explores
the ethical challenges facing the Army in an era of
persistent conflict dominated by a variety of irregular
threats. Pfaff argues that these challenges arise because
irregular adversaries change the character of their war
from imposing one’s will on the enemy to compelling
the enemy to accept one’s interest. While this shift
may seem subtle, Pfaff argues, it suggests a number
of important practical and ethical implications for our
way of war. Formerly, civilians were largely separable
from warfighting, meaning that our strategies of annihilation and attrition were the most effective—and
ethical—paths to victory. But now, when combating
irregular threats, civilians are no longer separable
from warfighting. Consequently, strategies of annihilation and attrition not only undermine a successful
resolution of the conflict, but they are unethical.
This last point suggests that the Army needs to
adapt the PME to account for these changes and to
adopt a number of policies and procedures to account
for the expanded role irregular conflicts demand Soldiers play. Colonel Pfaff offers a number of practical
measures the Army should take to meet this challenge.
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I invite our readers to learn more about this important topic, to test their own assumptions regarding the
moral challenges posed by the changing character of
war, and to initiate discussions on how our organization, the U.S. Army, should respond.

		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Combating irregular threats has challenged the
American “way of war” in a number of ways. Not only
does it challenge how U.S. forces fight, it also brings
into question the ethical norms they employ to govern the fighting. The resulting confusion is especially
evident in the public debate over the rules of engagement used in Afghanistan. On the one hand, many are
concerned that restrictions on the use of force have
placed Soldiers' lives needlessly at risk. On the other,
many are concerned that risking civilian casualties is
not only immoral in irregular war, but undermines
the war effort.
The rules of war entail balancing three competing imperatives: (1) accomplishing the mission; (2)
protecting the force; and (3) minimizing harm. Determining that balance entails determining where one
should accept risk. Accomplishing missions risks Soldiers and civilians; protecting the force risks mission
accomplishment and civilians; and minimizing harm
risks mission accomplishment and force protection.
Where risk should be accepted depends on the ends
the use of military force is intended to achieve, as well
as the character of the adversary.
To understand why the ends and adversaries associated with combating irregular threats pose special
challenges to ethical decisionmaking, one must first
grasp the complex relationship these competing imperatives have with the amount of risk Soldiers may
accept or the amount of risk to which they may assign
to others. Confronting such threats emphasizes populations rather than military forces and capabilities.
In doing so, it expands the ends and means of war,
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requiring Soldiers not only to defend the state, but
to impose civil order outside the state as well. These
complications fundamentally change the character of
warfare, requiring Soldiers to rethink where they may
incur and assign risk when balancing the ethical demands of their profession.
This point has important implications for the way
U.S. forces should fight irregular adversaries, and the
norms they should employ. First, it suggests that destruction of the enemy combat capability may paradoxically put true mission accomplishment at risk, especially when civilian lives are jeopardized. Second, it
suggests that as the supported government develops
the capacity for governance, the use of military force
must itself transition from warfighting, where some
collateral damage is inevitable, to law enforcement,
where it is not. This monograph will offer a number of
policy recommendations to accommodate these two
propositions.
What should also be obvious from this introductory framework is that the identity of the military professional will have to evolve to meet the demands of
the environment of irregular conflict. The good qualities of a military professional derive from the purpose
and function of the profession and the environment in
which it is practiced. As the function and the environment change, so must the qualities of the good professional. This monograph will thus offer policy recommendations for future Army leader employment and
development.
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RESOLVING ETHICAL CHALLENGES
IN AN ERA OF PERSISTENT CONFLICT
ETHICS AND COMBATING IRREGULAR
THREATS
It is famously observed that in war armies often refight their last war. This observation suggests that military capabilities rarely evolve faster than the threats
to which they must respond. The same is sometimes
true for the ethics intended to regulate fighting. The
ethics of war has, for the most part, evolved to govern
armed conflict where the warring parties attempt to
impose their will on each other. As such, militaries associated with states that recognize these restrictions
have developed the weapons and tactics that permit
them to destroy another state’s military forces while
observing their own ethical standards.1
But the character of warfare against irregular
threats2 is different from the kind of wars that traditional just war norms were meant to regulate. Rather
than facing enemies in open battle, for which the U.S.
military is well-suited, U.S. forces find themselves embroiled in complex counterinsurgencies and counterterrorist campaigns where identifying the enemy—as
well as identifying the best means to defeat him—is
filled with uncertainty. This practical uncertainty
entails ethical uncertainty as well: it is impossible to
know what the rules of the game are if one does not
know what game one is playing.
At its most basic level, the rules of war entail balancing three often-competing imperatives: (1) accomplishing the mission; (2) protecting the force; and (3)
minimizing harm. Determining where the balance
should lie depends on where one should accept risk.
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Accomplishing missions puts Soldiers and noncombatants at risk; protecting the force puts mission accomplishment and noncombatants at risk; and minimizing
harm puts mission accomplishment and force protection at risk. Where risk should be assigned depends
on the ends the use of military force is intended to
achieve. What those ends are depends on the character of the adversary.
To understand why the ends and adversaries associated with combating irregular threats pose special
challenges to ethical decisionmaking, one must first
grasp the complex relationship these competing imperatives have with the amount of risk Soldiers may
take or place on others. Combating irregular threats
complicates that relationship because it places emphasis on populations rather than military forces and capabilities. In doing so, it expands the ends and means
of war, requiring Soldiers not only to defend the state,
but to impose civil order as well. These complications
fundamentally change the character of warfare and
require Soldiers to rethink where they may accept and
place risk when balancing the ethical demands of their
profession.
THE ETHICAL PROBLEM: PERMISSIONS AND
RESTRICTIONS IN THE USE OF FORCE
Nothing captures the difficulties that combating
irregular threats places on the military ethic better
than the recent controversy surrounding the rules of
engagement (ROE) employed by U.S. Soldiers in Afghanistan. While these rules correctly recognize the
importance of minimizing risk to noncombatants,
they often increase the risk to Soldiers and, by extension, mission accomplishment. For example, while re-
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ceiving mortar fire during an overnight mission, a sergeant requested supporting artillery fire—a 155mm
howitzer illumination round—so that his unit could
better see the enemy’s location. Despite the fact that
illumination rounds are not designed to inflict casualties, higher headquarters rejected the request on the
ground that it could cause collateral damage.
Later, the same sergeant reported that his unit
came under heavy small arms and rocket propelled
grenade (RPG) fire, and he requested artillery to be
fired on the enemy’s position. This support was also
denied because of the proximity of Afghan civilians
to the fighting. To break contact with the enemy, the
sergeant then requested the supporting artillery unit
to fire smoke rounds to conceal their movement. Like
illumination rounds, smoke rounds are not designed
to cause casualties, though there is always a remote
possibility that the nonexplosive canister carrying the
smoke could hit someone. But while this request was
granted, the rounds were deliberately aimed one kilometer off the requested position for fear of injuring
civilians. As a result, the rounds were not effective for
concealing the unit’s movement.3
On the other hand, playing by the traditional rules
of war, rules that permit noncombatant casualties,
comes with its own risks. For example, in late 2003,
U.S. military commanders in Iraq adopted a range of
aggressive tactics intended to increase lethality and
make the cost of resistance too high for insurgents to
bear. In response to this guidance, Soldiers went into
Iraqi towns and villages kicking in doors and detaining scores of fighting-age “angry young men.”4 As one
embedded New York Times reporter noted, while these
measures may have been absolutely necessary, they
drained “whatever good will the Sunnis had left for
the Americans.”5
3

U.S. forces have seen similar reactions to collateral damage in Afghanistan. In fact, Afghan President
Hamid Karzai, responding to public outcry, has repeatedly called for International Security Assistance
Forces (ISAF) to curtail operations and eliminate civilian casualties altogether.6 Despite the fact that U.S.
strikes against insurgent positions are almost always
proportionate and discriminate, insurgents are often
able to portray their casualties as civilian casualties.
Additionally, insurgents are able to exploit the fact
that Coalition forces operate in a way that tolerates
noncombatant casualties. Insurgents thus portray not
only their own casualties, but also the civilian casualties the insurgents themselves cause, as being a result
of Coalition operations. The result is civilian outrage
and calls by Karzai’s government to constrain U.S. operations.7
What these examples show is that there is an inherent tension between the imperatives of accomplishing
missions, protecting the force, and minimizing harm
to noncombatants that often makes finding ethically
permissible courses of action difficult. Further, these
examples suggest that finding such courses of action
requires assessing where to accept risk; they also suggest that where one should accept risk is situation-dependent. This means that general rules meant to cover
a wide range of situations will be difficult, if not impossible, to establish. Rather, ethical behavior against
irregular adversaries will be somewhat ad hoc, that is,
it will require individual Soldiers and their leaders to
be sensitive to local conditions at the time and the particulars of their mission, their organization, and the
civilians in their area of operations.
Toward the end of articulating a method for Soldiers to make ethical decisions when combating irreg-
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ular threats, the next section will discuss the competing imperatives and the impact combating irregular
threats has on their application. This will allow a
clearer formulation of the ethical problem from which
it will be possible to determine an ethical approach
better suited to the demands of this kind of war.
THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY ETHIC:
BALANCING RISK
Accomplishing the Mission.
Military ethics begins with the utilitarian imperative to accomplish missions. The logic is fairly
simple. If one’s cause is just, one maximizes the good
by achieving it. Thus, actions that lead to victory or
avoid defeat are not just permissible, they are obligatory. Additionally, it is a feature of any utilitarian
ethic that the greater the good, the greater the kinds of
harms that may be done in its name. While the use of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or mass killings
of noncombatants would normally be ruled out, if
victory—depending on what was at stake—becomes
more elusive or defeat more imminent, indiscriminate
acts of violence may under certain circumstances be
justified.8
However, this permission does entail a restraint.
Though utilitarian ethics do not rule out any particular
kinds of acts, they do rule out acts whose outcomes result in more harm than good.9 This restriction, referred
to as proportionality, requires Soldiers to limit the use
of force relative to the value of the military objective.10
The value of the military objective is measured against
its contribution to the ethical objective of war: to establish a better state of peace than the status quo ante
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bellum.11 Thus indiscriminate acts would most often be
unjustified because the harm they cause undermines
the chance for a better peace.
Protecting the Force.
In tension with the requirement to accomplish the
mission is the competing requirement to protect one’s
Soldiers.12 While the imperative to accomplish missions obligates officers to put their Soldiers’ lives at
risk, a broader view of military ethics must also consider the obligations officers have to preserve their
Soldiers’ lives and well-being. Such measures have
both utilitarian and moral aspects to their justification. From the perspective of military necessity, officers are obligated to preserve their forces so they may
continue the fight. From a deontic perspective, officers
are morally bound to give force to the proposition that
Soldiers are human beings with their own rights to life
and liberty.13
Minimizing Harm.
In fact, it is these rights to life and liberty that justify fighting in the first place. Most Just War theories
define war in terms of some violation of a state’s political sovereignty or territorial integrity.14 But these
“state rights” are not in themselves worth defending,
but rather derive their value to the extent that their
preservation secures the rights of citizens to life and
liberty.15 Because these rights are universal, they restrict the kind of harms Soldiers may commit. This
restriction, referred to as noncombatant immunity,
requires Soldiers to discriminate when applying force
and prohibits intentionally targeting civilians as well
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as surrendered or incapacitated enemy Soldiers.16 Because Soldiers receive training, equipment, and other
resources to reduce their risk when fighting, it follows
that they must accept some additional risk if it means
preserving the lives of noncombatants who, by definition, have not received those resources.17
The Ethical Problem.
From this admittedly brief analysis, it is easy to
see how difficult ethical decisionmaking for Soldiers
can be. They are required to achieve a trifecta—to win
wars, preserve Soldiers’ lives, and minimize harm to
noncombatants. Even in conventional conflicts, where
combatants are easier to distinguish from noncombatants, such a trifecta can be difficult enough. But enemies like Hamas, al Qaeda, and the Taliban are not
only indistinguishable from the civilian population,
they deliberately operate close to densely populated
areas in order to exploit any collateral damage inflicted by our forces.18 Figure 1 depicts the multidirectionality of forces affecting ethical decisionmaking, which
entails trading off between risks associated with the
triple imperatives of accomplishing the mission, protecting the force, and avoiding harm to noncombatants.
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Risk to Mission

Risk to Civilians

Risk to Soldiers

Figure 1. Ethical Decisionmaking.
This complex ethical environment places Soldiers
in a difficult position. To win the war, Soldiers must
find and engage the enemy within the target population, which increases their vulnerability to attack.
Their alternative is to use weapons of greater lethality
and range, which increases their own safety but decreases their ability to discriminate combatants from
noncombatants. Further, the enemies’ disregard for
noncombatant lives also places enormous pressure on
Soldiers to discount that constraint and thus “level the
playing field.” It is one thing to say the right to life
is universal. It is another to say that an enemy noncombatant’s right to life takes priority over the right to
life of the Soldiers under an officer’s charge. When the
enemy intentionally places noncombatants in harm’s
way, they force Soldiers to weigh mission accomplishment and force protection against the rights of those
noncombatants. If the risks to the mission and one’s
forces becomes so great as to jeopardize operational
integrity, it is not clear that Soldiers are required to
take those risks.19
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What should be clear from this discussion is that
the way many current adversaries fight is putting
pressure on U.S. forces to change the way they fight.
To explain the effects of such pressure, the next section will articulate and compare the “conventional”
U.S. way of war with the irregular way of war and
establish a foundation from which to articulate an ethics for combating irregular threats.
“WAYS OF WAR” AND ETHICS OF WAR
Clausewitz and the U.S. Way of War.
The Western “way of war” draws heavily on Carl
von Clausewitz’s view that war deals with imposing
one’s will on the enemy. This view entails a number of
dichotomies.20 The actors in war are either friends or
enemies; actions in war entail resistance or surrender;
and the end-state of war is victory or defeat. It is true
that enemies may fight to a stalemate, but such a state
of affairs is not stable, representing only a suspension
of hostilities until the sides decide to fight again. The
state of war itself continues until the hostile relationship has transformed into one of peaceful competition
or one or both sides have ceased resisting the other’s
will.
The logic of war in the Clausewitzian view is simple in expression, but difficult in application. One has
imposed one’s will successfully when the enemy no
longer has the capability to resist. One eliminates the
enemy’s capability to resist by eliminating his combat
capability faster than the enemy can eliminate one’s
own. Doing this requires a strategy of annihilation—
or at least attrition—that seeks a head-to-head battle
aimed at destroying as much of the enemy’s forces, as
well as his ability to generate new ones, as possible.21
9

The “way of war” that emerges from this sort of
confrontation with the enemy, is, as historian Victor
Davis Hanson puts it, “so lethal precisely because it is
so amoral—shackled rarely by concerns of ritual, tradition, religion, or ethics, by anything other than military necessity.”22 Hanson is not saying here that Western militaries do not often observe restraint in war.
His point is that Western and, by extension, American
thinking on war is driven by the idea of “enemy as
existential threat” who must be defeated in order to
preserve the kinds of individual freedoms that have
shaped western societies since the time of the ancient
Greeks.
From a practical perspective, this way of war adjudicates “better” and “worse” in terms of maximizing the risk to the enemy and minimizing risk to one’s
own side. Sociologist Martin Shaw refers to this kind
of war as “risk-transfer war,” which he sees as synonymous with the Western and American23 ways of
war. In such wars, it will always be preferable to fight
in response to threats to national values and interests and in a way that minimizes risk to a society’s
social, political, and economic institutions. Because of
the democratic nature of Western governments, wars
must also maximize gain and minimize risk to the political leadership that declared the war. To do so, wars
typically must be limited in duration and scope.24
In this view, when fighting wars, one must minimize one’s own casualties while killing the enemy “efficiently, quickly, and discreetly.”25 Recognizing that
war’s destruction tends to alienate the electorate and
undermine the legitimacy of the war effort, destruction of the enemy is better when it remains “invisible”
to the outside world. Such invisibility entails a preference for precision weapons and a reliance on airpower
so as to limit risking one’s ground forces and inflicting
10

collateral damage. But despite the emphasis on minimizing collateral damage, this way of war will subordinate risk to noncombatants in order to minimize
risk to friendly combatants.26
It is not hard to see how this view of war shapes
its ethics. Just as Clausewitz limits war to military
force, the Western ethics of war requires Soldiers to
discriminate between targets associated with the enemy’s military capability and those that are not. When
force protection and mission accomplishment together would seem to put noncombatants at risk, the Western solution is to put force protection at greater risk in
favor of reducing noncombatant risk while preserving
mission accomplishment. There are limits to this risk.
The imperative of mission accomplishment dictates
that neither suicide nor mission failure can ever be
ethically obligated. Thus Soldiers are not obligated to
accept so much risk that they either cannot accomplish
the mission or continue the war effort.
Thus, this ethics not only informs the way the
United States wages war, but also harmonizes with
it. This balance of imperatives does not interfere with
the successful waging of war; moreover, by limiting
the damage to civilian lives and property, this ethic of
war limits post-conflict grievances and facilitates the
transition to peace. Of course, there have been times
when Western militaries have attacked purely civilian targets. But here is where the exception proves the
rule. Even Air Force General Curtis LeMay believed
that bombing purely civilian targets was opposed to
the law (if not ethics) of war but fell within the scope
of how wars are won.27
The point of this discussion is not to suggest that
the Western way of war is useless. In conventional
terms, the U.S. military in particular has often been
more effective than its non-Western counterparts. One
11

need not look far for affirmation. The Allied victory
over Japan in World War II and the U.S. victory over
conventional Iraqi forces in 1991 and 2003 serve as but
two examples in a very long list.
But ethics aside, this way of war also has its limitations. The United States defeated the Iraqi military,
but it has not yet achieved its political goals in Iraq.
Going a little farther back, it is also worth noting that
while the U.S. military was successful in its operations against the North Vietnamese military, military
success did not achieve the desired political ends. In
fact, there have been a number of times when military might actually worked against achieving political
ends. The reason is that imposing one’s will is only the
instrumental end of war. Given that there are other
material ends of war, enabled by imposition of will,
strategies of attrition and annihilation are not always
the best ways to achieve them.
Political scientist Patricia Sullivan attributes such
less than optimum approaches to a misalignment
between war aims and war strategies. She notes that
war aims fall into two broad categories: (1) targets of
acceptance, and (2) targets of compliance. The former
category involves imposing one’s will and thus a certain state of affairs on an enemy. The latter involves
pursuading an enemy to see to one’s interests and act
in a way that realizes and maintains a certain state of
affairs. As noted earlier, one succeeds in the former
kind of war by pursuing strategies of annihilation and
attrition. Sullivan notes, however, that such strategies
can often work against targets of compliance. In fact,
she notes, when larger states have lost to weaker states
in the past, it has often been in attempts to make the
weaker state change its policy. This counterintuitive
result comes from the fact that while military force can
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force acceptance, it cannot change someone’s mind
about what they want.28 For that, one needs to be able
to shape the enemy’s interests.
Sun Tzu and the Irregular Way of War.
U.S. adversaries have exploited the misalignment
Sullivan has identified. Recognizing that the United
States is unrivaled as a conventional military power,
these adversaries have largely abandoned the idea
that a war with the United States will ever result in imposing their will. Rather, they have undertaken means
and ends aimed at compelling the United States to accommodate their interests. To illustrate this point and
the implications it has for the U.S. way of war, contrast Clausewitz’s view articulated above with that of
the ancient Chinese general, Sun Tzu. Noting that war
“is a matter of vital importance to the state,”29 he does
not limit its application to the use of military force at
all. In fact, he admonishes the would-be general not to
put a premium on killing, adding that “to subdue the
enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”30
Thus, for Sun Tzu, war is paradoxically limited in
its goal but unrestricted in its means. But by unrestricted, he is not referring to violence as much as he is the
means employed. War begins long before the first shot
is fired and requires all the elements of national power
to set the conditions for a preferably bloodless acquiescence of the enemy. As historian Michael Handel
noted, Sun Tzu “views the political, diplomatic, and
logistical preparations for war and the fighting itself
as integral parts of the same activity.”31
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Working in the tradition of Sun Tzu, two Chinese
senior colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiansui, in the
book Unrestricted Warfare, argued that failure to recognize this broader view of war is a U.S. vulnerability
that weaker states, like China, can exploit.32 Writing
in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, they acknowledged that it would be suicide for any state to take on
the U.S. conventional forces. But they also observed
that the U.S. military does a poor job of deliberating
upon future fights: “lucid and incisive thinking . . . is
not a strong point of the Americans. . . . U.S. military
preparations for future conflict focus almost exclusively on conventional forces.”33 They go on to point
out that “such ridiculous thinking” has caused the
United States to be unprepared to fight terrorism and
other unconventional threats.34
More importantly, the situation they describe
would appear to be enduring. This point does not
suggest that the United States will never fight a conventional war again. But as long as the United States
remains unchallenged in its conventional capabilities,
its prudent enemies will avoid directly confronting
those capabilities. Employing the language of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, Qiao and Wang implicitly argue
that U.S. conventional success has more or less permanently transformed the character of war: war is no longer “using armed force to compel the enemy to submit
to one’s will,” but rather “using all means, including
armed force or nonarmed force, military and nonmilitary, and lethal and nonlethal means to compel the
enemy to accept one’s interests.”35
Thus, as Dr. Sullivan suggested, the shift of war’s
aim from imposing one’s will to gaining acceptance
of one’s interests in turn changes what it means to
fight well, in both the practical and ethical sense. In
this view, military force is just one element of national
14

power that can be used to wage war against an enemy. The list of such elements includes nuclear, diplomatic, financial, network, trade, bio-chemical, intelligence, resources, ecological, psychological, economic
aid, space, tactical, regulatory, electronic, smuggling,
sanction, guerrilla, drug, news media, terrorist, virtual, ideological warfare, and many more.
Additionally, these elements of warfare can be
combined in infinite ways to form various kinds of
warfare.36 For example, the Chinese colonels describe
the U.S. war on terror as “national terrorist warfare
+ intelligence warfare + financial warfare + network
warfare + regulatory warfare.” They also describe efforts by the Hong Kong government in 1998, just prior
to its return to Chinese government control, as a war
fought with “financial speculators,” using financial
warfare combined with regulatory, psychological,
and news media “warfare.”37
From this shift in ends emerges a view of war that
expands on Clausewitz, changing war’s scope. Friend
and enemy are joined by collaborator and competitor;38
resistance and surrender are replaced by acceptance
and rejection; and victory and defeat are replaced by
success and failure. Further, friend and enemy do not
refer simply to states, but to substate and nonstate organizations as well. Additionally, such conflicts are
not zero-sum. If one can achieve one’s interests by
benefiting the enemy, or some subgroup within the
enemy’s community, so much the better.
The Ethical Implications of Combating Irregular
Threats.
This description of multifaceted warfare against
irregular adversaries better accounts for the kinds of
conflicts the United States is currently facing. By shift15

ing the emphasis away from imposing one’s will to
accepting one’s interests, this view of war shifts the
emphasis of engagement from military capability to
the people. This shift subjects civilians and civilian
institutions to competing efforts of co-option and
coercion where both sides attempt either to win the
populace to its cause or prevent the enemy from doing
the same. As Rupert Smith notes in The Utility of Force,
in such conflicts, the loyalties, attitudes, and quality
of life of the people do not simply impact the outcome
of a conflict: they determine it.39 Because of this shift
in emphasis, Smith argues that these conflicts are best
described as “wars amongst the peoples” where the
enemy operates among the civilian population in part
because of one’s conventional prohibitions against
targeting them.40
Operating within the civilian population, the enemy depends on that population for shelter, food, medical assistance, finances, and other types of support.
This relationship entails collaboration on the part of
some, if not all, of that population, though it does not
follow that this support is given willingly: the ability of
the enemy to exact it determines his strength. Hamas,
for example, routinely places rocket and mortar positions near schools, residences, and other civilian sites
to exploit any resulting collateral damage. Similarly,
it forcibly moves civilians into areas where the Israelis
are expected to attack.41
Willing or not, this relationship draws the civilian
population into a status logically inseparable from
warfighting, making them necessary, if not legitimate,
targets of war. What makes them necessary targets is
the fact that the irregulars (or militarily weaker side)
could not fight without their support, and we (the
militarily stronger side) cannot win if we do not undermine it.
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The Ethics of Combating Irregular Adversaries.
This shift in emphasis from combat forces to populations poses a significant ethical as well as practical
challenge to the Western way of war. In terms of practical challenges, population emphasis suggests that
the United States must incorporate all the elements of
national power to ensure success; moreover, to realize
its interests, it must do so in a way that both coerces
and attracts the population. It is beyond the scope of
this discussion to amplify this point much further.
But it does suggest that there is an ethical as well as
practical requirement to develop and implement these
broader means. In ethical terms, the challenge arises
because of the intermingling of combatant and noncombatant as adversaries exploit civilian populations.
Challenges also result, of course, from the necessaary
prohibitions intended to protect the population from
the suffering caused by war.
It is for this reason that combating irregular threats
does not lend itself to the easy dichotomies of civilianmilitary or combatant-noncombatant. Irregular actors
hide among civilian populations, making civilians
complicit, if not willingly so, in their activities. But
one must not assume that civilian complicity and liability cause a loss of their immunity when we operate against irregular threats. This line of argument is
essentially the same as the one made by controversial
academic Ward Churchill in echoing Osama Bin Laden’s justification for striking the World Trade Center
in New York. Alleging the Twin Towers occupants’
indirect contribution to American military might, both
argued that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
were justified because of their relationship to U.S. mil-
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itary policies they believed were unjust. Setting aside
the sheer illogic of these claims, it is worth examining
whether and to what extent civilians should be targeted in the course of combating irregular threats.42
Thus, it does not follow that by virtue of being
members of a particular population, individuals have
necessarily made a choice that justifies our killing or
even targeting them. However, to the extent that a
government or other political entity represents itself
as a threat to some other group, the way its members
choose to participate in that effort can affect whether
or to what degree they may be ethically exposed to
certain kinds of retaliation. As the philosopher Thomas Nagel notes, a person may be subjected to hostile
treatment by virtue of the threat that person represents, since “hostility or aggression should be directed
at its true object.”43
In Nagel’s view, one is ethically permitted to
subject a person to hostile treatment only because of
something that person does, and further, the hostile
treatment must be directed at the person in virtue of
the threat posed. In conventional jus in bello terms, it
follows from this argument that combatants may be
killed, since they embody the threat represented by
the enemy state; and noncombatants may not, since
by virtue of being noncombatants, they do not represent that threat. Of course, this argument does not
necessarily exempt civilians from being targeted. For
example, it is permissible to target munitions workers
even though they are not uniformed members of the
military. This permission is due to the fact that their
activity is not logically inseparable from warfighting.44
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Discrimination: Enemies, Criminals, and a Just
Peace.
In determining what measures are permissible in
such a complex environment, one must also take into
account the ethical aim of the state’s use of force in
the first place. Despite the change in the character of
war, the fundamental question about the ethicality of
war is still a question of justice. While there are many
concepts and forms of justice, at its most basic justice
is about getting what one deserves.45 In the context of
national security, what one deserves is what one has a
right to, which as I have previously stipulated is, at a
minimum, life and liberty.
The responsibility for ensuring that individuals
enjoy such rights falls on the state by virtue of the social contract. The state ensures these rights by creating
law enforcement and military institutions that provide
the kind of security required for the exercise of those
rights. Security, being indivisible and nonexcludable,
is a public good, meaning that its provision is subject
to the demands of distributive justice.46
Providing security requires the sovereign to form
institutions around which the distribution of social
goods is organized. These institutions identify a public system of rules that define how other individuals,
which I will refer to as the state’s agents, identify their
positions, rights, roles, and duties.47 Institutions, in this
sense, can be both abstract and concrete. For example,
one may speak of “the military” when determining
the roles, rights, duties, powers, prohibitions, permissions, and obligations associated with certain aspects
of national security.48 More concretely, one may refer
to the “Department of the Defense (DoD),” which is
the practical U.S. manifestation of “the military” actually charged with the roles and responsibilities associ19

ated with maintaining national security. Collectively,
the institutions which employ the various powers of
the state are the state. Individuals who operate within
these institutions thus take on the obligations of the
state insofar as the exercise of such obligations is compatible with the role they play within that institution.
It is important to note, however, that despite the
fact that military and law enforcement institutions
share a common purpose—to protect citizens of their
state—they differ significantly because of the different kinds of threats they confront. Militaries confront
enemies who are capable of violating the state’s right
to political sovereignty and territorial integrity. Criminals, on the other hand, threaten individual rights.
While widespread criminal activity can place so much
pressure on government institutions that they collapse, normally they do not represent a threat to the
state itself. How these dual roles inform the ethics of
combating irregular threats is discussed later.
It is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper to
establish what appropriate state institutions should
exist, given the range of cultural, social, and political conditions. But the paper does suggest that if the
purpose of fighting wars is to establish a just peace,
then, once established, the purpose of continued military operations is to maintain that peace. A just peace
entails not simply a cessation of hostilities, but the
presence of just institutions capable of sustaining that
peace. Given these considerations, one can say a state
of peace exists under the following conditions: 49
•	The enemy is defeated or transformed into
a nonexistential threat either to one’s state or
to the imposition of a just host-nation government.
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•	There exist institutions necessary for enforcing
the rule of law, including police, courts, and
prisons.
•	These institutions must be fair, honest, and
credible, where citizens are willing to rely on
them to resolve disputes rather than resort to
violence to resolve disputes themselves.
Of course, these conditions do not spontaneously
emerge when the war ends. In fact, it may not be clear
when a particular conflict ends. There is no clear signal, like an offer of surrender, marking when an irregular threat no longer exists. If the enemy does surrender, it usually comes long after the threat has been
contained. As a matter of course, “winning” is usually manifested by the ability of one side to impose
its order on the population in question, however that
population is identified.
This point means that counterinsurgent forces
must often transition from conditions of war, where
no institutions associated with civil society exist, to
conditions of peace where such institutions come into
existence and are capable of enforcing the just rule
of law on their own. It is a fact of many conflict and
post-conflict situations that even when such institutions exist, they are not always effective. Institutional
development in conflict and post-conflict situations
proceeds in stages. It begins with imposing order,
then transitions to protecting minority rights, and
then ends with local institutions capable of sustaining
a just social order.50
As the operating environment transitions from
warfighting to civil society, the state’s obligation to
protect its citizens may fall on foreign military forces
supporting it as well. Whatever the actual reasons the
higher headquarters had in the ROE contretemps dis21

cussed earlier, it was right to take into account how
the sergeant’s request for smoke and illumination
might endanger civilians. As the Afghan government
continues to develop institutions necessary to provide
security in a just manner, U.S. forces must not only
shoulder their responsibility to avoid harm to themselves, but also their responsibility to protect those
civilians. Figure 2 depicts the inverse relationship between the strength of civil institutions on one hand,
and permissions regarding the use of force and collateral damage on the other. As the capability of civil
institutions increases to the point that they are strong
enough to provide basic security needs for a given
population, collateral damage becomes no longer permissible since it represents the kind of violence those
institutions are supposed to prevent.
More
Collateral damage
not permissible

Use of Force

Risk to Soldiers

War fighting
Most force permissible

Law Enforcement
Least force possible
Less

Less

Transitions to Civil Society
Strength of Civil
Institutions

Risk to Civilians

More

Figure 2. The Inverse Relationship
between the Strength of Civil Institutions
and Permissions Regarding the Use of Force
and Collateral Damage.
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Thus, as civil institutions become stronger, susceptibility to risk decreases for civilians while increasing
for Soldiers, as well as police and other security services. In other words, the risk shifts from civilian to
security provider.
Whether the decision to withhold fire support was
in fact the right one depends on whether the state, in
fact, had control over that territory. As noted earlier,
the state’s responsibility to protect is enabled by its
right to sovereignty and territory. Where an enemy
has effectively taken territory and displaced the state’s
institutions, then the threat is no longer criminal, and
great force is permitted. This point will be discussed
in more detail later.
However, as this example shows, in the context of
this transition from war to peace, the central difficulty
when combating irregular threats is sorting out the
combatants from enemy collaborators among one’s
own supporters. This sorting is further complicated
by the fact that some collaborators are coerced, and
some nominal allies have ties to and even sympathies
for the enemy. Additional complications arise when,
unlike in conventional conflicts, the activities of insurgents and their supporters take place in the same
space as routine and peaceful civilian activity, making
it difficult to determine who is complicit with the enemy and who is not.
Thus as a practical matter, distinguishing between
combatant, noncombatant, and supported can be very
difficult, if not impossible. In such contexts, restricting
one’s efforts to engaging only armed elements of the
insurgency can have the dual effect of jeopardizing
the stronger side’s chances for victory, and prolonging the conflict, paradoxically leading to more harm
to noncombatants.
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Resolving the paradox requires expanding the set
of legitimate targets while reducing the occasions for
the lethal use of force. Further, in expanding the set
of legitimate targets, one must take into account their
relationship to the actual threat Soldiers face. Taken
together, these points suggest the following permissions and restrictions regarding the requirement to
discriminate permissible targets from the impermissibles:
•	Members of the general population may be subject to law enforcement measures regardless of
their level of cooperation with the enemy, such
as curfews and increased security measures, as
well as information operations.
•	Members of the population who indirectly, but
unknowingly, support enemy activities may be
required to cease such activities, even if it negatively impacts their quality of life.
•	Members of the population who directly and
knowingly support the enemy but do not engage in violent activities—the actual threat
they represent being indirect and they being
no threat if there were no enemy—may not be
targeted for killing, but rather must be treated
as criminals.
•	Members of the population who participate in
violent activities may be killed or detained. To
the extent that these members of the population
represent a threat to the government, collateral
damage may be permitted.
•	Members of insurgent and terrorist groups
may be targeted for killing if they represent an
enemy threat in the sense described above. If
they represent a criminal threat, again in the
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sense described above, they must be targeted as
criminals and killed only when it is not possible
to detain them.
In addition to standard jus in bello restraints, this
analysis also suggests that it would not be permissible
to target the following:
•	Members of the population who, if targeted,
will not have an effect on the outcome of the
conflict. This is not controversial, as no theory
of just war would endorse gratuitous targeting.
•	Members of the general population may not be
harmed, even collaterally, if the threat represented by the adversary may best be described
as criminal.
SUMMING UP: BALANCING COMPETING
IMPERATIVES
As discussed above, the aim of operations against
irregular adversaries should be the establishment of
a just civil society capable of securing the rights of its
members without representing a threat to the rights
of members of other societies. As in Iraq and Afghanistan, such conflicts often start as wars, where combatants are relatively easy to distinguish from noncombatants. In such cases, traditional just war norms would
apply.
However, as these conflicts also show, the battlefield defeat of those forces does not always mean an
end to fighting. However, though the fighting continues, it does not follow that the conflict is unchanged.
Where the major combat operations that began the
war were aimed at imposing U.S. will on the Iraqi and
Taliban governments, after their defeat the aim of the
war transitioned to persuading elements of the popu25

lation to accept the other’s interest and manifest that
acceptance in the form of a government they would
all accept.
What norms apply then depends on the kind of
threat the adversary represents. At this point, warfighting ceases to be about defeating enemy forces but
compelling the population to accept the legitimacy
of a new government. The burden of risk thereupon
should shift to reflect the rights and responsibilities of
that government. If the rights of a state rest on its citizens’ rights to life and liberty, individuals and groups
that threaten those individual rights but not the state’s
rights, are then best conceived as criminal. While they
do not directly threaten those state’s rights, their
threat to individual rights still places a burden on the
new state to protect those individual rights.
When it comes to the use of force, military and law
enforcement organizations instruct their forces to always use the least force necessary. However, these entities have very different conceptions regarding what
is the least force necessary. Under conventional just
war norms, the military seeks to use the most force
permissible, given the requirements of proportionality
and discrimination. In the conditions of civil society,
law enforcement seeks to use the least force possible.
The different conceptions are due to the way each
perceives and is trained to deal with threats. To the
police, the threat is a criminal they must apprehend
in order to minimize disruption to society. Since the
use of violence represents a further disruption of the
peace, police are always looking to use the least force
possible. In this view, no use of force where civilian
bystanders will knowingly, though unintentionally,
be harmed is permitted.
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However, Soldiers are trained to defeat enemies
who must be killed if there is to be peace. They are
always looking to reduce risk to themselves by using
the most force they have available. As noted previously, that force should be tempered by the amount
of risk Soldiers must assume rather than putting noncombatants at risk.51 This feature of conflict gives us
two models of threat that states may face: warfighting
and law enforcement. States have developed different
institutions to deal with each; they employ very different forces, methods, and ethics in facing those threats.
These divergent conceptions of necessity determine
different permissions regarding the use of force.
Mission Accomplishment and Proportionality.
In both models, mission accomplishment remains
an imperative. Typically, Soldiers may risk only mission failure—or more accurately, forgo the mission
altogether—when the degree of risk assigned to noncombatants results in harm done that is disproportionate to the good achieved.52 When calculating proportionality, Soldiers fighting enemies must weigh
the harm the Soldiers do against the requirements of
future peace. Actions that will perpetuate animosity
and make a stable peace difficult to attain need to be
weighed against any action intended to achieve that
peace. Soldiers engaging criminals are obligated to
weigh the harm done against the requirements of the
current peace. This restriction would not only limit engaging in violent actions, it would also preclude nonviolent actions that nonetheless disrupted the peace,
such as mass detentions or excessive restrictions on
movement.
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Force Protection.
As noted above, the degree of risk Soldiers are obligated to accept is limited only by the requirements of
force protection and mission accomplishment. Under
the law enforcement model, Soldiers are obligated to
accept certain risks so as to prevent harm to civilians,
but they may not put those civilians at risk.53 There
are conditions, for example, in which law enforcement
officials will allow a suspect to escape rather than put
bystanders at risk of serious physical injury or death.
However, they would not stop their pursuit of that
criminal nor their efforts to prevent future criminal
acts.54 Thus, if the choice is to forgo harming civilians or
conducting a particular mission, Soldiers must choose
to forgo conducting that mission. This requirement
does not mean, however, they must forgo achieving
their objective, just that they must find another way
to do it. Additionally, like police, Soldiers are not obligated to risk serious physical harm or death simply to
apprehend a single individual unless that individual
represents an immediate harm to others.
Minimizing Harm.
When discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate targets, Soldiers fighting enemies must
observe the negative obligation to minimize noncombatant casualties. Soldiers engaging criminals must
avoid such casualties altogether. Additionally, under
the criminal model, Soldiers have a positive obligation
to protect civilians from harm in the same way police
have an obligation to protect civilians.55 This latter
condition assumes that Soldiers can act as police in the
given area of operations. Where that authority does
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not exist, Soldiers may engage the adversary under
the enemy model, but only in order to establish a law
enforcement capability as rapidly as possible.56
IMPLICATIONS FOR LEADERS
What should be obvious from this framework
is that the identity of the military professional will
have to evolve to meet the demands of the environment of operating against irregular adversaries. The
good qualities of an officer derive from the purpose
and function of the profession and the environment
in which it is practiced.57 As the function and the environment change, so must the defining qualities of the
good officer.
When fighting enemies, qualities such as decisiveness, aggressiveness, and unwillingness to compromise are essential to achieving peace. Under the criminal model, traits such as tact, restraint, diplomacy, and
patience are paramount. Balancing the requirements
of these sometimes competing models poses a problem for the officer. In fact, several studies have noted
that the “professional career Soldier is not necessarily the best person for peace-keeping (or law enforcement) tasks.”58
It is worth noting that the traits described above
for both models are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The difference derives from which traits dominate. Thus the challenge for the officer is to cultivate
new traits, while not allowing the old ones to atrophy. Additionally, the officer will have to develop the
judgment to determine how these traits apply across a
range of environments.59
As previously discussed, combating irregular
threats requires Soldiers to have a great deal of lo-
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cal knowledge so they may best account for local
needs and interests in order to bolster the supported
state. However, the higher one is in the chain of command, the more difficult it is to retain and apply this
knowledge in the context of a particular operation.
This feature of irregular warfighting puts pressure on
traditional Army culture, which assigns near total responsibility to the commander for whatever happens
in his or her command. As a result, commanders tend
to retain at their level the authority to make critical decisions, a tendency resulting in relatively centralized
decisionmaking.
However, as the sergeant in the ROE example
experienced, while higher headquarters are adept at
applying general rules and guidance, they cannot—at
least not consistently and effectively—take into account the many nuances associated with combating
irregular threats, such as the relative value of any particular operation, the relationship of particular locals
to enemy forces, or how much risk civilians will be
exposed to by a particular course of action. As a result,
what emerges is a cacophony of decisions that sometimes place Soldiers at extreme risk and at other times
lead to unnecessary civilian casualties.
It is beyond the scope of this discussion to fully
articulate the implications of this point for traditional
command responsibility, but it does follow that decisions regarding the use of force should be made at
the lowest level feasible. This will require leaders to
have extremely good local knowledge, since they will
have to live with both the negative and positive consequences of their decisions. However, a leader who has
developed a sense of obligation toward members of
the local population will be in a better position to determine what level of force is appropriate within the
framework articulated in this discussion.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PROFESSION
This monograph suggests the following measures
the profession should take to provide the officer corps
with the wherewithal necessary to conduct ethical operations when facing irregular adversaries:
• 	Develop the capability to conduct law enforcement operations and establish civil institutions
in post-conflict environments. Application of
force under the criminal model depends on
access to functioning law enforcement institutions. These institutions are usually not available to foreign forces. This suggests that when
confronting irregular adversaries, militaries
must incorporate this institutional capability
into their organization. In some cases, this capability development will require integrating
military and civilian capabilities under a unified command. Failing to invest in such capabilities will lead to increased risk to noncombatants that could have been reasonably avoided.
To the extent that a supporting state would
have invested in those capabilities to avoid risk
to its own citizens in similar circumstances, it
should do so as well when conducting operations in foreign countries.
• 	In environments where the enemy is sufficiently strong to prevent the establishment of such
institutions, Soldiers may conduct operations
under the enemy model even though the adversary may not meet the enemy criteria. But
these operations must include the goal of creating an environment where police methods and
forces would be effective.
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• 	Modify ROE to reflect the restrictions inherent
in the criminal model. Additionally, commanders will need to develop a framework for shifting between the two models.
• 	Increase the use of and training in nonlethal
weapons. This will give Soldiers more options
when dealing with situations where it is difficult to discriminate between combatants and
noncombatants.
• 	Revise the ethical development of officers to
include traits associated with law enforcement
and peacekeeping, while preserving those normally associated with warfighting.
• 	Revise the conception of command responsibility and intra-command risk-sharing to permit
greater decentralization regarding the decision
to use force. Place the decision to use force at
the lowest level feasible. Determining the appropriate level should take into account the
individual leader’s experience and knowledge
of the local environment as well as the means
employed in achieving military objectives.
CONCLUSION
If one views the character of war as the imposition
of one’s will on the enemy, then one will naturally emphasize coercive strategies of attrition and annihilation that eliminate resistance. Such a view, of course,
does not ignore constraints in war, but as the distinction between what is and is not logically separable
from warfighting blurs, the range of potential targets
expands. As it does, the burden of risk shifts to the civilian population, increasing the potential for human
rights violations.
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On the other hand, if one’s view of war favors compelling the enemy to accept one’s interests, then one
must employ a mix of coercive and persuasive inducements aimed at shaping the enemy’s interests in conforming. While this view does not ignore the requirement to kill, it often subordinates eliminating enemy
combat capabilities in favor of achieving complementary political goals. As the distinction between politics
and warfighting blurs, risk shifts back to combatants,
who must often sacrifice short-term military goals for
the sake of long-term institutional development. But
if one over-emphasizes such attractive measures over
coercive ones, one creates space for the enemy to operate, prolonging the war and putting one’s own Soldiers—as well as civilians—at unnecessary risk.
Placing the burden of risk on the enemy means
placing it on the civilian population as well. One could,
and in some cases should, accept more risk to one’s
citizens and Soldiers, but if one treats that imperative
as an absolute, one abandons one’s obligation to those
persons as well. In these kinds of conflicts, it is not uncommon to feel that one is placed in the position not of
balancing ethical demands, but of abandoning them.
However, abandoning one’s ethical obligations is
not only unethical, it is unnecessary. It is, of course,
beyond our scope here to fully spell out how one
should balance these imperatives in each instance.
However, what this analysis has shown is that when
combating irregular threats in environments where
stable peace exists, Soldiers are ethically obligated to
employ means that avoid harm to noncombatants. In
environments where there is no peace, Soldiers may
undertake actions that place noncombatants at risk,
but must observe the traditional restrictions of proportionality and discrimination.
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The fact that enemy and criminal threats are often
found within the same battle space provides extraordinary ethical as well as practical challenges to officers
of all ranks. To confront such threats without betraying the rights and values Soldiers are defending, military leaders must reconsider the application of force.
This will require not only radical adjustments to training, force development, and task organization, it will
also require a fundamental rethinking of the Soldier’s
identity.
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